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PoEtry and EMPhatiC truth:  
WaLtEr BEnjaMin’s rEading oF höLdErLin1
Poesía y Verdad enfáTica:  
La LecTura de höLderLin Por Benjamin
Richard Eldridge
rEsuMEn
El presente trabajo comenta la teoría poética de Walter Benjamin. Se hace notar que 
Benjamin sigue a Hölderlin al considerar que un verdadero poema es una configuración 
particular en la que se juntan los órdenes intelectual y perceptivo. Un verdadero 
poema aspiraría no a la verdad como correspondencia con un objeto determinado, 
sino a algo que en el texto se describe como “verdad enfática”.
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aBstraCt
Benjamin’s poetic theory is commented. It is noted that Benjamin follows Hölderlin 
in regarding a successful poem as a particular configuration that joins the intellectual 
and perceptual orders. Such a successful poem aims at and can possess not truth as 
correspondence to a given object, but rather what in the text is described as “emphatic 
truth”.
KEyWords: Walter Benjamin, Hölderlin, emphatic truth, literary criticism
In a letter to Martin Buber in July, 1916, Benjamin criticizes a view of  the 
“relationship between language and action in which the former [is merely] 
an instrument of  the latter,” and he proposes instead to understand “writing 
[Schrifttum] as such as poetic, prophetic, objective in terms of  its effect, but in 
1 This text is a section from my book Images of  History: Kant, Benjamin, Freedom, and the Human 
Subject, forthcoming (Fall 2016) from Oxford University Press.
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any case only as magical [magisch], that is as un-mediated [un-mittel-bar].”2 As both the 
context of  a letter to Buber (against a background of  discussions of  Kabbalah 
with Scholem) and the word “Schrifttum,” which describes professional, learned, 
or sacred texts, in contrast with the more colloquial “Schreiben” for writings in 
general, suggest, Benjamin is here concerned with a particular and specialized 
kind of  writing, not with all written texts, in particular with a kind of  writing that 
can be prophetically effective for action in relation to fundamental issues of  life. 
Somewhat paradoxically, this specialized form of  writing wins its effectiveness 
through “the crystal-pure elimination of  the ineffable [die kristallreine Elimination 
des Unsagbaren]”: “only where this sphere of  speechlessness [diese Sphäre des 
Wortlosen] reveals itself  in unutterably pure power can the magic spark leap between 
the word and the active deed [bewegender Tat], where the unity of  these two is 
immediately actual.”3 Benjamin’s modernist distaste for instrumentalist planning 
and for decoration, ornamentation, and personal expression plus his contrasting 
preference for exactness of  description are already here fully developed and on 
display. As Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe remarks about this letter, “this page contains 
the poetic art of  Benjamin, [and] he remained faithful to it in all he wrote.”4 
As well as being broadly derived from a concept of  the sacred object, the 
general idea of  a work of  literary art as effective through the achievement of  
presence is prominent in the German tradition at least as far back as Lessing’s 1766 
essay Laocoön, where, while in the first instance sharply differentiating the effects 
and techniques that are proper to the distinctive media of  painting and poetry, 
Lessing also goes on to pose as a normative demand for poetry the achievement 
of  the “painterly [malerisch],” a “combination of  features by means of  which 
the poet makes his subject so perceptible that we are more clearly conscious 
of  this subject than of  his words.”5 The achievement of  such presence in the 
work affords the reader an experience of  absorption in the work as it presents its 
subject. The presentation of  the subject in the work is hence anschaulich or intuitive 
in guiding the reader’s attention to just this thing, presented in just this way there, 
not primarily discursive or classificatory. The painterliness that the successful 
poem achieves in its sensuous presence to the reader falls under the heading of  
Anschaulichkeit: an imagistic clarity or understandability, where one engages with 
2 Benjamin (2012, p. 80); GS Briefe I, p. 126.
3 Ibid., p. 80; GS Briefe I, p. 127 (translation modified.)
4 Lacoue-Labarthe (2002, p. 12).
5 Lessing (2003, p. 79).
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both the work and its presented subject matter by way of  the focus of  perception 
on a this.  At the same time, however, just in virtue of  requiring and affording a 
temporally extended experience of  reading, the literary work that achieves this 
kind of  Anschaulichkeit also requires intellectual and discursive activity on the part 
of  the reader, who further has available the possibility of  reflection throughout 
the experience of  reading. 
Describing this achievement and characterizing its importance philosophically 
is a major topic of  Hölderlin’s poetic theorizing, where he emphasizes the 
importance of  harmonious alternation in the experience of  the successful poem 
between free reflection and absorption in sensuous presentation. “The foundation 
and significance of  the poem… lies between the expression (presentation) and 
the free idealistic treatment.… This is what lends the poems its seriousness, 
its firmness, its truth; it protects the poem [by assuring] that the free idealistic 
treatment [--the thematization that is taken up in the reader’s reflections--] become 
not an empty affectation, and the presentation [of  the particular subject in just 
this way] become not vanity.”6 Both potentially empty, free, idealistic moralizing, 
untethered to sensuous experience of  an existing object and potentially vain, 
gratuitous, wallowing in the object or in the words that sensuously present it, 
without reflective thought, are to be avoided. The point of  constructing a poem 
that embodies Anschaulichkeit in living alternation with thematic materials for 
reflection is to find oneself, either as reader or writer, at home in one’s world, 
at least for a moment, as both an active and a natural, embodied being. Or, in 
Hölderlin’s formulation, the successful poem answers to the need of  the I—the 
human subject as such—“to recognize its unity [as a reflective, active subject] 
in the harmoniously opposed [--the object of  configured attention--] and [to 
recognize] the subjective (harmoniously opposed) in its unity [as an object formed 
for its attentions].”7 An experienced object that supports a successfully modulated 
poem as a form of  attention to it thus functions, in Thomas Pfau’s useful phrase, 
as a vehicle of  “analeptic Ahndung” or restorative presentiment.8
6 Hölderlin (1988, p. 66).
7 Ibid., p. 75.
8 Pfau (1988, p. 28). “Ahndung” is Hölderlin’s archaic, Swabian spelling of  “Ahnung”; 
“analeptic” is a medical term meaning “restorative” or “stimulative.” The object that is 
experienced in and through the poem is more than either a thing simply recognized under 
a concept or a source of  immediate sense experience. Instead it is an an object that is both 
received and attended to, in such a way that the experiencing subject feels more fully its powers 
as a subject as potentially effective in relation to empirical life.
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Following Hölderlin, Benjamin develops his own poetic theory in his 1914-
15 “Two Poems by Friedrich Hölderlin.” Like Hölderlin, Benjamin regards the 
successful poem as a “particular configuration  [besondere Gestalt] that joins “the 
intellectual and perceptual orders.”9 Given the assumption, as Benjamin puts it 
in his 1919 “Fate and Character,” that “between the active man and the external 
world, all is interaction [Wechselwirkung]; their spheres of  action interpenetrate,”10 
a successful poem, as a depiction not of  empirical objects as such, but of  human 
experience and of  human being in relation to empirical objects, must join the 
intellectual and perceptual orders, in presenting a process of  interaction that 
involves both perceptual intake and intellectual reflection. Unlike the depiction 
of  empirical objects in relation to each other and apart from human involvement, 
so far as this is possible and achieved in either natural science or mere recognitive 
perception, for Benjamin, “the act of  poetizing” has, in Fenves’ formulation, “an 
objective intention [that] is categorically different from any other act,  …. [where] 
the ‘truth’ of  poetry is not understood as the correspondence between thinking 
and being or between subject and object but, rather, in terms of  ‘fulfillment’ 
(Erfüllung), on the one hand, and ‘objectivity’ (Gegenständlichkeit), on the other.”11 
The successful poem must present, in Hölderlinian terms, a modulated sequence 
or alternation of  thoughts and perceptions that are bound together in attending 
to an object.12
This distinctive objective intention or aim to be realized in successful poetizing 
is not limited only to lyric poetry. It covers other forms of  modern literary art, 
such as drama and the novel.  Given that literary reading itself  involves active, 
modulated, perceptual, and reflective attention to a work, seeking orientation in 
relation to the experience of  it, just as orientation is sought within the literary 
work in its attention to its object, this distinctive objective intention covers the 
aim of  criticism, too.13 As Winfried Menninghaus puts it, explicating and citing 
Benjamin’s doctoral dissertation on German Romanticism, 
9 Benjamin (2002, p. 19); GS II, 1, p. 106.
10 Benjamin (2002a, p. 202); GS II, 1, p. 173.
11 Fenves (2010, p. 23).
12 See Hölderlin’s thought that “poetic life with respect to its content remains …essentially 
unified … [insofar as] it exists as such in definite form and progresses through the alternation 
of  moods where each time the succeeding mood is determined by the preceding one” (1988, 
p. 68).
13 Though it is present already in Benjamin’s Hölderlin essay, this idea is not directly derived 
from Hölderlin, for whom poetry was sharply distinct from both criticism and philosophy. The 
Análisis. Revista de investigación filosófica, vol. 2, n.º 2 (2015): 301-310
Poetry and the Emphatic Truth: Walter Benjamin’s Reading of  Hölderlin 305
As a representation of  works based on their own features, critique is not a judgmental 
‘reflecting on a work of  art’, but rather a consciousness-raising ‘unfolding’, in a 
new formation, of  that ‘reflection’ which itself  already exists in the work as its 
structural principle. Both work and critique are thefore ‘relative’ moments in the 
same medium of  reflection.14 
Within both poetry and criticism, the fulfillment and objectivity (Erfüllung 
and Gegenständlichkeit) that are sought involve a fullness in both presenting and 
embodying a modulated but incomplete experience that fails, necessarily, fully 
to capture a given, discrete object for a given, discrete subject. In presenting a 
modulated but open alternation of  perceptions and reflections, the successful 
poetical and critical work embodies what Benjamin came in his Goethe essay 
to call a Wahrheitsgehalt or truth-content, distinct from its Sachgehalt or material 
content—its subject matter (theme plus plot) plus arrangement of  words.15 While 
embodied in the Sachgehalt and only analytically distinct from it—“the more 
significant the work, the more inconspicuously and intimately its truth content 
is bound up with its material content,”16 a successful work’s Wahrheitsgehalt is its 
embodiment and presentation of  the vicissitudes of  an aptly attentive subject 
to the Sachgehalt throughout the subject’s alternations of  mood, perception, and 
thought, vicissitudes marked in the successful work by both a fullness of  modulated 
attention and a constitutive incompleteness arising out of  an insuperable gap 
between the discursive human subject and the course of  nature as a whole. Hence, 
as Beatrice Hanssen puts it, the achievement of  Wahrheitsgehalt, in presenting these 
vicissitudes, runs 
counter to the poetical ideal of  ever attaining a revealed language of  plenitude. 
…It [offers] a philosophical anamnesis of  nature, a figure suppressed in Hegel’s 
philosophy of  spirit, …a radically different mode of  recollection [from that of  
Plato or Hegel] consist[ing] of  a reflection to the second power in which reflection 
pondered its own negativity and finitude.17 
idea that criticism and philosophy should themselves be poetically organized is prominent, 
however, in the fragments of  Friedrich Schlegel, and it is developed by Benjamin at length in 
his doctoral dissertation “The Concept of  Criticism in German Romanticism.”
14 Menninghaus (2002, p. 49), citing Benjamin’s “The Concept of  Criticism in German 
Romanticism,” SW I, pp. 151ff  and SW I, p. 146.
15 See Benjamin (2002b, p. 297); GS 1, 125.
16 Ibid.
17 Hanssen (2002, pp. 141-42).
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The direct argument of  the 1914-15 essay on Hölderlin turns on close 
comparisons between Hölderlin’s second draft of  a lyric that describes the stance of  
the poet, “The Poet’s Courage [Dichtermut]”, 1801, and his immediate revision of  
it, “Timidity [Blödigkeit]”, also 1801. These comparisons emphasize the relatively 
dogmatic, assertational character of  the earlier version, contrasted with the more 
open, processual, experience-related, living, and modulating character of  the later 
version. Thus Benjamin remarks that the earlier version foregrounds “mythology” 
over “perceptual world formation,” as though the thought of  the poem were 
formed first, via reading and general reflections alone, independently of  perceptual 
experience. Hence Hölderlin in the earlier version is caught up in “grasping at 
externals,” and “the indeterminacy of  the shaping figure …dissolves the figure of  
the poet,” insofar as we are unable or less able to recognize in the development 
any modulated alternations on the part of  a plausibly living speaker. The Parcae 
or Fates who are invoked are “related [verwandt]” as it were observationally, or 
introduced as symbols, rather than being in any way present in experience. The 
poet simply “reaches with both hands into an alien world order, grabs at people 
and God to raise within him his own courage.” The result is an isolated, static 
image manifesting “a nonperceptual conception of  life, an unmythic, destiny-less 
concept of  life stemming from a spiritually exiguous sphere.” In the later version, 
in contrast, “the gods and the living are bound together,” in alike living within 
fateful life processes, without orienting certainties. The Parcae are “recognized 
[bekannt]” as similar to the poet and the people, rather than invoked or presented 
as symbolic spiritual others. “At the center of  the poem men, heavenly ones, 
and princes—crashing down from their old orders, as it were, are linked to one 
another.” “A structuring movement” of  modulation in thoughts, perceptions, 
and reflections on the part of  an attentive, nondogmatic, and recognizably living 
subject runs “from verse to verse.” “The traditional and simple superiority of  
mythology is transcended” in favor of  genuineness of  presentation of  the poet 
bound within the destiny of  a “situation” [Lage] wherein attention and reflection 
are possible, even skillfully achievable, but never completable.18 
These comparisons are developed on the basis of  an initial general poetic 
theory that centers on the concept of  das Gedichtete, the poetized. Benjamin 
defines this, initially somewhat paradoxically, as “the particular and unique sphere 
in which the task and precondition [Aufgabe and Voraussetzung] of  the poem 
18 All quotations in this paragraph are from Benjamin (2002, pp. 23-27); GS II, pp. 109-14.
Análisis. Revista de investigación filosófica, vol. 2, n.º 2 (2015): 301-310
Poetry and the Emphatic Truth: Walter Benjamin’s Reading of  Hölderlin 307
lie.”19 The air of  paradox diminishes somewhat if  “of  the poem” is emphasized in 
this sentence. That is to say, for any particular poem, there is a distinctive situation 
of  a worldly subject undergoing a course of  experience that is to-be-addressed 
or worked through.20 That there is such some such situation is, as Benjamin 
says, a precondition for any particular poem, and the poem, in turn, has the task 
of  working it through. Hence it is true both that “the task is derived from the 
poem itself ”—that is, from the situation to be addressed on which it distinctively 
focuses, and “the task”---that it is to work through this—“is also to be understood 
as the precondition of  the poem.”21 Benjamin describes the situation of  a subject 
in the world that is to-be-worked through as “the intellectual-perceptual [geistig-
anschaulich] structure of  the world to which the poem bears witness [die geistig-
anschauliche Struktur derjenigen Welt, von der das Gedicht zeugt].”22 Here the 
term “world” [Welt]” indicates, as in Heidegger’s contrast between world [Welt] 
and earth [Erde], not either nature or the material stuff  of  the universe as a whole, 
but rather a course of  experience within a situation. Something has happened 
to or for an experiencing subject, over some period of  time, within a situation, 
and this something that has happened—the intellectual-perceptual content of  
this situated experience, an initially perplexing course of  perceptions, reflections, 
emotions, and attitudes—is to be addressed, worked through, and brought to 
clarity. It is the situation of  the subject in the world or the full content of  the 
subject’s experience that the poem takes as both its subject matter (precondition) 
and its material to be worked through (task). 
Hence the “’truth’ [of  the poem], which the most serious artists so insistently 
claim for their creations, shall be understood as the objectivity [Gegenständlichkeit] 
of  their production, as the fulfillment [Erfüllung] of  the artistic task in each case.23 
The poem, that is, achieves its truthfulness or fulfillment when it embodies 
fullness of  attention to its [geistig-anschaulich] experienced object, without lapsing 
into shirking, reverie, or cliché. Perceptual content, thought, and emotional 
stance within a worldly situation are modulated. There is developing content 
that is presented over the course of  time of  the poem, and this presentation of  
developing content within the poem attends to, works though, and intensifies, in 
19 Ibid., p. 18; GS II, p. 105.
20 Compare the discussion of  working through as the task of  literary art in Eldridge (2008, 
pp. 111-12, 119).
21 Benjamin (2002, p. 18); GS II, p. 105.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., p. 19; GS II, p. 106.
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being free from distractions and irrelevancies, the course of  experience within 
a worldly situation that was to be worked through.  The poem achieves, that 
is to say, a “synthetic unity of  the intellectual and perceptual orders,”24 in that 
the course of  thoughts, the course of  perceptions, and the course of  emotional 
stances are apt to one another. There is an achievement of  fullness of  attention 
on the part of  an experiencing subject, embodied in “the fundamental aesthetic 
unity of  form and content,”25 where “aesthetic unity” indicates an appropriate 
modulated and developed relation among elements that remain distinct from one 
another as moments of  the experience. 
This amounts, in turn, to the achievement of  fuller life as an attentive subject. 
“For the creator, the idea of  the task is always life. …In [the poetized] life 
determines itself  through the poem, the task through the solution [bestimmt sich 
das Leben durch das Gedicht, die Aufgabe durch die Lösung].”26 That is, the life 
of  the subject takes on more intensity, a shape of  fuller attentiveness, through the 
composition of  the poem, and that very solution in turn characterizes and reveals 
the problem situation that was to be worked through. “(For task and solution 
can be separated only in the abstract.) [(Denn Aufgabe und Lösung sind nur in 
abstracto trennbar,)]”27 Insofar as a successful poem—one that avoids shirking, 
reverie, and cliché—achieves an “intensity of  the coherence of  the perceptual and 
intellectual elements” as opposed to “a slack extension of  feeling” [eine schlaffe 
Ausdehnung des Gefuhls],28 “a judgment, even if  unprovable [zu beweisen], can 
be justified [zu begrunden],”29 insofar as a critic may similarly work through in an 
attentive modulated way the experience of  the diverse elements of  the poem.30 
This kind of  criticism itself  poetically unfolds the composed content of  the 
poem in the interest of  fullness of  attention to it. Both the poem and criticism as 
unfolding commentary aim at and can possess not truth as correspondence to a 
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid., pp. 19-20; GS II, p. 107.
27 Ibid., p. 19; GS II, p. 107
28 As David Wellbery usefully notes, “Benjamin repudiates the vitalist ideology of  immediate 
expression which animates virtually of  post-Diltheyan Literaturwissenschaft,” focusing instead 
on the work as composed expression, more in the manner of  New Criticism than of  any form 
of  biographical criticism (1986, p. 27).
29 Benjamin (2002, pp. 20, 21); GS II, 107, 108.
30 Two important articles that develop this conception of  critical working through, altogether 
independently of  Benjamin’s work, are Isenberg (1949) and Cavell (1969).
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given object, but rather what David Wellbery aptly describes as “emphatic truth” 
in the fulfillment via composition of  the poem’s task.31 This emphatic truth in 
the service of  fuller life, achieved in and through the work, is the aim of  literary, 
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